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Is your valley as green as it should be? Incorporating economic 
development into environmental performance indicators  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Sustainability rankings are receiving increasing attention by the academic and the policy making 
communities because of their potential to influence environmental legislation and reshape 
competitive landscapes. Unfortunately, most of the indicators used to produce these rankings do 
not take into account economic development and tend to be biased in favor of richer countries. To 
circumvent this limitation we develop a novel, rigorous and simple metric that ranks countries by 
their potential environmental performance relative to their wealth; in other words, by the degree 
of sustainability that a country should achieve, given its level of affluence. We apply our approach 
to measure the sustainability level of 15 developed economies with respect to the share of 
renewable energy sources in their electricity generating portfolios. The resulting ranking produces 
changes in the perceived greenness of certain countries. If adopted, it would allow these countries 
to increase their bargaining power in international negotiations. It would also alter the pressure 
faced by their governments to implement or discontinue environmental policies such as feed-in 
tariffs. Although we applied it at the country level and in the context of renewable energy, the 
method has far-reaching implications and it can also be used to compare corporate sustainability 
levels.  
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1. Introduction 
Measuring a country’s environmental performance relative to that of its peers is becoming an 
increasingly important exercise, with relevant policy-making and business implications. 
International negotiations on climate change, the adoption of regional emission standards and 
even debates over domestic waste management policies are often directly or indirectly influenced 
by how a country scores against other nations in a number of sustainability dimensions.  
Motivated by the above requirements and by growing public concern over the quality of 
life, several rankings of countries’ sustainability have been put forth by experts and practitioners 
alike. Prominent examples such as the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), the Human 
Development Index or the Ecological Footprint indicator play an important role in orienting the 
public debate on environmental and development policies. Through their strong influence on 
public perception, such rankings affect the position and actions of national delegations in 
international negotiations. They also shape domestic policies by creating social and institutional 
pressure on governments, which may result in the enforcement of stricter environmental 
legislation in certain jurisdictions. The business community too follows these developments with 
an interested eye because of their potential impact on the attractiveness and the competitiveness 
of certain markets. The automotive industry’s resistance to the progressive tightening up of 
vehicle emission limits in certain jurisdictions is, for instance, a typical case in point. 
The basic premise behind such indexes is that the “higher” a country’s position in the 
ranking, the higher its level of greenness and the more environmentally proactive its population. 
In the case of climate change discussions, for instance, countries are typically compared using 
the percentage of electricity generated from renewable sources as the discriminating factor, with 
the implicit assumption that countries with a higher share of renewables are inherently greener 
and more virtuous.  
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However, if “greenness” were a “luxury” that richer nations could afford to buy and if 
environmental awareness were a relative wealth notion, such indices would not reflect the actual 
sustainability performance of the countries being ranked. An emerging body of research suggests 
that developed nations “maintain their privileged place in the world (and relatively pristine 
environments) partly by transferring many of the negative consequences of industrialization onto 
poorer regions” (Morse and Fraser 2005; p.636). If that is the case, are the existing rankings that 
do not take this “wealth bias” into account a fair means of comparison and a valid instrument to 
support the design of environmental policies? 
Consider, for example, the case of Brazil and Rwanda.  Despite the major land 
degradation problems affecting the Amazon rainforest2, which have implications for climate 
change at the global level, Brazil enjoys a much better EPI ranking (46 in the 2016 ranking) than 
poorer countries such as Rwanda (147 in the 2016 ranking)3, where environmental problems 
have only local consequences. Although the significant gap between these rankings might result 
from actual differences in environmental performance, the comparison suggests that a country’s 
wealth plays an important role in orienting its choices towards more sustainable paths.  
If economic growth is an important driver of sustainability, how, then, can we compare 
different countries on a fair basis using simple, widely applicable and easy-to-implement 
methods? Unfortunately, as much as they are widely used, established multi-criteria indexes such 
as the EPI are not well suited to that purpose. By giving more importance to variables in which 
advanced economies score better than poorer nations, these indicators make rich nations look 
clean by design (The Ecologist, 2001).  
                                                          
2
 Based on computer models, Laurance et al. (2001) make grim predictions about the condition of Brazilian 
Amazonian forests by 2020. Foley et al. (2007) review recent research to highlight the tremendous loss and 
degradation of Amazonian rainforests.   
3
 Hsu et al. (2016). 
5 
 
In order to address this issue, we propose an innovative index of environmental 
proactiveness that explicitly takes into account the role of wealth and economic growth as 
sustainability drivers. Our approach is based on the idea that countries should be ranked not by 
their actual (or gross) environmental performance but rather by the difference between their 
actual environmental performance and their potential environmental performance—i.e., by the 
degree of sustainability that they should achieve, given their level of affluence. The central 
premise of our approach is that the consumption of environmental goods such as renewable 
energy resources is costly. Thus the demand for such goods arises only after a country has 
reached a certain level of wealth and it keeps increasing with economic growth. Indeed, if we 
inspect the EPI for 2016, it is easy to notice that countries with higher per capita income score 
far better in environmental performance than their less wealthy counterparts. This hypothesis is 
highly consistent with a strand of literature that focuses on the relationship between 
environmental degradation and income per capita – the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve 
(EKC), predicting an inverted U-shaped relationship between environmental degradation and 
income per capita. At the early stages of growth, per capita pollution increases because 
investments are allocated to the cheapest and dirtiest technologies, and it decreases after income 
per capita crosses the GDP threshold, when investments get redirected to more efficient (but 
more expensive) technologies. 
Drawing upon the above observation we develop a novel wealth-adjusted indicator of 
environmental performance and we illustrate it through an application to the case of renewable 
energy diffusion. After empirically estimating the relationship between per capita Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and renewable energy share for 15 OECD countries, we compute the 
difference between a country’s average GDP per capita and its estimated RE turning point (i.e. 
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the level of affluence above which renewables start being massively adopted). We then use the 
so-obtained index to rank the 15 countries based on their pseudo willingness-to-pay for cleaner 
energy technologies. Finally, we compare the resulting ranking to a ranking based on a simpler, 
unadjusted measure of RE adoption. The results suggest that taking into account economic 
growth significantly alters a country’s environmental ranking and confirm that the proposed 
method allows for the incorporation of fairness considerations in a simple, intuitive and yet 
robust manner. Thus, we suggest the approach can be widely applied to compute other wealth-
adjusted measures of environmental performance, which focus on other environmental issues 
such as waste or air and water pollution. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
literature on environmental indicators. Section 3 summarizes the theoretical background 
underlying our proposed approach. Section 4 illustrates the proposed indicator, the method to 
compute it and the associated econometric issues. Section 5 presents an application to the case of 
renewable energy adoption in 15 OECD countries. Section 6 concludes and indicates avenues for 
further research. 
2. Literature review 
Although the concept of sustainability has come to the public attention in the past few decades, 
its concept and consequences have been observed for centuries. The city of London, for example, 
has been struggling with air pollution resulting from burning “sea coal” as early as 13th century. 
Policy intervention to modify behavior has an equally long history. In London, the situation 
became so bad in 1307 that King Edward 1 intervened prohibiting, by a decree, the use of sea 
coals in lime kilns because of the “intolerable smell” that resulted in “annoyance … and injury of 
their bodily health” for all in the vicinity (Clark 2015). Despite the long history of policy makers 
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to intervene when sustainability issues are at stake, policy making for sustainability is not 
without its challenges (Common 1995).  
One of the most important of such challenges for making sustainability policies is 
tracking progress in sustainable development.4 (This is partly because the concept of 
sustainability spans various environmental, social and economic factors. There are numerous 
indices and assessment methodologies to track progress in multiple dimensions ranging from 
energy-based indices to social and quality- of-life-based indices (for a comprehensive review see 
Singh et al. 2009). On the other hand, aggregate sustainability indices attempt to rank or 
compare human events or development over an uncertain information landscape. In doing so, 
they also stir a debate on their significance and legitimacy in guiding decision makers to measure 
the impact of policy response through aggregated indicators. Anthropologist Ian Morris offers a 
convincing argument to dispel the doubts surrounding the use of composite indicators at all 
levels. As he writes: “reducing the ocean of facts to simple numerical scores has drawbacks but it 
also has the one great merit of forcing everyone to confront the same evidence—with surprising 
results” (Morris, 2011, p. 497).5  
Over the past 20 years, there have been dramatic increases in the development and use of 
indicators as a basis for cost effective and efficient means of to inform decision making and 
management (Hsu et al., 2013). For example, Parris and Kates (2003) note over 500 sustainable 
indicator efforts in existence in 2003.6 Böhringer and Jochem (2007) provide an overview of 
several sustainability indices that are widely used in the policy debate. These include the Living 
                                                          
4
 See Fig. 1 in Moldan et al. (2012) for various indicators of monitoring progress of Goal 7 (environmental 
sustainability) of the Millennium Development Goals. 
5
 Originally cited in Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014). 
6
 Created in 1934, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has become a ubiquitous measure of economic progress. 
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Planet Index (LPI, WWF 1998), Ecological Footprint (EF, Wackernagel and Rees 1997), City 
Development Index (CDI, UNCHS 2001), Human Development Index (HDI, UNDP 2005), 
Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI, Esty et al. 2005), Environmental Performance Index 
(EPI, Esty et al. 2006), Environmental Vulnerability Index (EVI, SOPAC 2005), Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare/Genuine Progress Index (ISEW/GPI, Cobb 1989), Well- Being 
Index (WI, Prescott and Allen 2001), Genuine Savings Index (GS, Hamilton et al. 1997), and 
Environmental Adjusted Domestic Product (EDP, Hanley 2000). In surveying these indices, 
Böhringer and Jochem (2007) note a number of weaknesses in methodological calculations, thus 
stressing the need for caution in interpreting the results or projections that appears from these 
indicators. 
Among the various methodological challenges associated with constructing valid and 
reliable sustainability indicators, it is clear that one should take into account a country’s level of 
wealth, but how to do so remains a particularly thorny problem.7 In the attempt to approach this 
problem, GDP has been proposed as a measure of public well-being. The argument that GDP 
(and GDP per capita) are very crude indicators of human development is not new, and many 
researchers have attempted to develop alternatives and/or supplements to GDP without much 
success in the academic, social and political communities. Frugoli et al. (2015, p. 379) argue that 
non-GDP indices are not yet “capable of encompassing all of the significant aspects of 
economic, social and environmental well-being”. In a detailed study, Giannetti et al. (2015) 
summarizes the main challenges that confront the construction of indices that intend to go 
beyond GDP. The most typical difficulties for the cross-country comparisons are the paucity of 
good data and deciding how to weigh environmentally oriented indicators. For instance, global 
                                                          
7
 Liu et al. (2016) convert economic products and services (along with other socio-economic and thermodynamic 
basis) into one coherent energy equivalent in constructing their Emergy Sustainability Index.     
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warming may mean a lot to Scandinavians, but people in the poor world’s filthy cities care much 
more about local air or water pollution. A more fundamental problem with approaches 
alternative to GDP rests in the distinction between GDP and economic value. It is not difficult to 
compute value for environmental assets, but it is almost impossible to put a number on them. 
And until we have a price for every environmental service, efforts to adjust GDP for pollution 
and depleted resources will remain highly challenging.8  
In summary, despite the various approaches proposed, the question of how to effectively 
incorporate a country’s level of economic development into the calculation of its environmental 
performance remains open. In this paper, we aim to contribute to this debate. We argue for the 
case that GDP per capita is a driver for attaining higher environmental quality and we propose a 
method for incorporating this effect in the design of sustainability rankings. In the section below, 
we provide a number of reasons in favor of this hypothesis suggesting that increases in income 
have both direct and indirect effects on the demand for environmental quality. 
3. Theoretical background 
The main theoretical argument used in our analysis to study the income-environmental quality 
relationship originates from the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). According to the EKC 
hypothesis, during the early stages of a country’s development process environmental 
degradation and pollution increase. It is only after economic development, and consequently per 
capita income, has reached a certain threshold that per capita pollution reduces. This implies that 
any environmental impact indicator is an inverted U-shaped function of income per capita. 
Grossman and Krueger (1991) first provided empirical evidence in favour of this hypothesis, 
                                                          
8
 There is a similarity of this issue with information goods, where accounting for services such as Wikipedia or 
Google search in official GDP is devilishly difficult.    
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although it is Panayotou (1993) who first coined the term “EKC” after the original Kuznets curve 
(that refers to income inequality). Since then there has been a diffusion of empirical studies 
testing the validity of the EKC hypothesis with a variety of data and econometric methodologies 
– see Stern (2014), among others, for a survey of empirical studies on the EKC relationship. 
In this paper, we argue that the same reasoning as applies to an environmental version of 
the Kuznets curve can also be used to describe the supposedly non-linear relationship between 
renewable energy development and income, especially among rich countries. In the same way 
economic growth has brought large scale availability of potable water and increased protection 
of human populations against both water- and air-borne disease in industrial countries (cf. 
Dasgupta 2010), a similar process is at work in the United States and the European Union that 
has resulted in acceleration in renewable energy diffusion as a viable alternative to traditional 
fossil fuels—particularly coal and oil. Because of the relatively high cost of renewable energy 
sources such as solar and wind, today it is mostly rich countries that are able to afford the 
widespread adoption of such technologies through generous support measures. 
Wealth exerts an indirect effect on environmental quality, too. As average education 
increases with rising income, environmental awareness and the concern for reduced life 
expectancy grow accordingly. Put differently, growing economic affluence of a country induces 
the population to demand greater environmental quality because of its effects on quality of life 
and wellbeing (Bayer and Urpelainen 2013).9 Such demand may create “institutional pressure” 
and induce policy makers to implement legislation that makes renewables more competitive vis-
a-vis fossil fuel technologies, thereby creating new market opportunities. Lieb (2003) cites a 
                                                          
9
 The argument that the demand for environmental quality rises with income is typically advanced under the 
“prosperity/affluence hypothesis” in environmental economics (e.g. Baumol and Oates 1979). A recent study by 
Saad and Taleb (2018) underscores economic growth as a core factor to improve renewable energy consumption in 
the short run among 12 EU countries. Further, renewable energy stimulates economic growth in the long run.   
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number of studies showing evidence (i) that advanced social, legal, and fiscal institutions may 
only be feasible in rich democratic countries, (ii) that higher GDP makes policy-decisions more 
environmentally friendly, (iii) that democratic countries have lower pollution levels, and (iv) that 
democracies are more likely to sign international environmental agreements.  
Recently, Aflaki et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence for the existence of a renewable 
energy (RE) version of the environmental Kuznets curve. In the latest edition of the World 
Energy Outlook, the International Energy Agency also notes that “energy intensity falls and GDP 
per capita grows in all regions in the New Policies Scenario” (WEO 2017; p. 287). 
4. Methods  
4.1 Overall Analytical Approach 
Applying the above insights from the EKC hypothesis, we develop a novel metric of 
environmental proactiveness that ranks countries by their environmental performance relative to 
their wealth. Whereas existing rankings such as the EPI are constructed based on the actual 
appropriation of environmental resources (e.g. forests, fisheries, air quality), we focus on a 
country’s affordability (measured by income per capita) as the main driver of environmental 
quality. This ranking is consistent with the fact that in a market economy, the consumption of 
environmental services is ultimately shaped by supply (i.e. the availability of financial resources 
for environmental protection) and demand (i.e. the citizens of affluent countries demanding 
higher environmental quality) factors.  
Our approach follows a three-stage process. We first apply a macroeconomic model to 
estimate the relationship between a raw indicator of environmental performance – i.e. the amount 
of investment in renewable technologies for energy production – and economic wealth, measured 
by GDP per capita. Second, we use the coefficient estimates from the econometric model to 
calculate the “turning point” income per capita. This is the threshold wealth level at which a 
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country starts redirecting investments from polluting technologies to more environmentally 
friendly options. Finally, we measure environmental proactiveness as the difference between a 
country’s average income per capita and its turning point income per capita. We dub this term 
“pseudo willingness to pay” (pseudo-WTP), because of its direct analogy with the willingness to 
pay notion in economics. If the value is positive, the country is environmentally proactive, 
indicating that at least certain segments of its population are willing to buy environmental 
products and services before other needs are satisfied. Likewise, if the value is negative, a 
country is dubbed as environmentally passive, suggesting that investments in environmental 
technologies are a second-order priority for most of its population. In a nutshell, the approach 
provides a simple and intuitive method to assess how inclined a country is to trade off affluence 
for higher environmental quality. 
The approach is implemented on data from 15 OECD countries over the period 1990–
2012. The 15 countries include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the United States. The 
main reasons for focusing on these countries owe to their higher renewable progress and their 
homogeneous policy framework. The start date was chosen to reflect the rapid deployment of RE 
sources after 1990 as a result of the energy policies adopted by the EU and the US; the endpoint 
was chosen based on data availability. 
4.2 Model Specification and Econometric Issues 
The typical EKC regression model used in our analysis, with modifications to match the 
available data is: ln 𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑖ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖(ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡)2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (1) 
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where i=1,…,15 and t=1990,…,2012 refer to country and year, respectively. RE is the 
share of renewable energy in total electricity generation (a raw indicator of “environmental 
quality”) and Y is GDP per person, both expressed in natural logarithms.  is an intercept that 
varies across countries, t is a linear time trend that captures the common technological trend 
towards lower costs in the renewable energy industry and  is a random error term. It is expected 
that 2 > 0, such that after income crosses a certain threshold level (or “turning point”), the 
diffusion of RE accelerates. However, the sign of 1 is indeterminate but is assumed to be 
negative in order to obtain a U-shaped renewables Kuznets curve. The turning point (𝑖) level of 
income for country i is obtained from: 𝜏𝑖 = exp (−0.5𝛽1𝑖/𝛽2𝑖). (2) 
 
The pseudo-WTP for a greener environment is then defined as: 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖 − 𝜏𝑖, (3) 
 
that is, the difference between GDP per capita and the turning point income. Thus, a 
pseudo-WTP>0 implies “environmental proactiveness,” whereas a pseudo-WTP<0 denotes 
“environmental passiveness”. Countries are then ranked in descending order based on their 
pseudo-WTP for a greener environment.  The above model is estimated using appropriate panel 
data estimator(s), with proper accounting of time-series properties and cross-sectional 
dependence in the data, as discussed in the next section (see Aflaki et al., (2014) for a detailed 
description). 
By the nature of our panel data, we apply the Common Correlated Effects (CCE) mean 
group estimator of Pesaran (2006), which permits individual-specific regressors, while at the 
same time allowing them to be cross-sectionally dependent. Besides cross-section dependence 
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(CSD), there are other forms of interaction among variables that are either unobservable or 
difficult to measure. Pesaran (2006) solved this problem by augmenting Equation (1) with the 
cross-section averages of the independent and dependent variables: ln 𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡 ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖(ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡)2 +  𝛿1𝑖𝑅𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛿2𝑖?̅? + 𝛿3𝑖?̅?2 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (4) 
where 𝛿𝑖 are the individual specific loading coefficients of the cross-sectional averages of all 
observable variables in the model. The 𝛽?̂? coefficient estimates the effect of income on RE’s 
contribution after controlling for common factors in the data. The dynamics and common 
unobserved factors are modeled in the error terms 𝜀𝑖𝑡, which are assumed to have the following 
structure: 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑖′𝒇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, (5) 
where 𝒇𝑡 is an 𝑚 × 1 vector of unobserved common effects and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 represents the country-
specific (idiosyncratic) errors that are assumed to be distributed independently of the regressors 𝒙𝑖𝑡 and 𝒇𝑡. However, 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is allowed to be weakly dependent across i. The CCE estimator is based 
on the assumption that 𝒙𝑖𝑡 is generated as: 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖′𝒇𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡, (6) 
where 𝑎𝑖 is a 𝑘 × 1 vector of individual effects, 𝜆𝑖 is a 𝑚 × 𝑘 factor of loading matrices with 
fixed components and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 represents the specific components of 𝒙𝑖𝑡 distributed independently of 
the common effects and across i. The CCE estimator is equivalent to ordinary least squares 
technique applied to an auxiliary regression such as Equation (2). The CCE mean group 
(CCEMG) estimator, which has been adopted in our application, is a simple average of the 
individual CCE estimators, 𝛽𝑖: ?̂?𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑀𝐺 = 1𝑁 ∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 .  (7) 
As pointed out by Eberhardt and Teal (2013), the CEE estimator is robust even when the cross-
section dimension N is small; when variables are nonstationary, subject to structural breaks; 
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and/or in the presence of “weak” unobserved common factors (spatial spillover) and global/local 
business cycles. 
4.3. Data and descriptive statistics 
The dependent variable of Equation (1), which accounts for the diffusion of RE sources, is the 
ratio of renewable to total electricity. This metric is commonly used to monitor the progress of 
RE development in OECD countries. RE share data were collected from the World Energy 
Balance dataset10, published by the International Energy Agency (IEA). The RE sources include 
geothermal, solar photovoltaics, solar thermal, tidal energy, wind power, waste, biofuels, and 
charcoal. Following the tradition of previous empirical work, we have excluded hydropower 
from the definition of RE. Affluence, the independent variable in Equation (1), was measured as 
GDP per capita (in 2005 US dollars). Data for this indicator were obtained from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicator. 
Figure 1 (upper panel) presents linear plots for panel data for the dependent and 
independent variables. The variables are shown in the way they are entered in the regression 
equations (i.e. log transformed). A general feature of the variables is that they all exhibit a 
smooth upward trend. The log of RE share depicts an interesting trend of convergence in RE 
sources across the EU countries. However, the logs of real per capita GDP—widely recognized 
as being unit root processes—show country variation in income among the EU nations.  
The lower panel in Figure 1 plots the kernel density estimates (smoothed histogram) for 
GDP per capita and the contribution of RE in electricity output for the countries in our sample. 
The solid (dashed) line is the kernel density estimate for the same countries in 1990 (2012). For 
GDP per person, the 2012 density has a shorter mode and is shifted to the right of the 1990, 
                                                          
10
 https://www.iea.org/statistics/relateddatabases/worldenergystatisticsandbalances/ 
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implying an increase per capita income as well an indication of rising income convergence 
between advanced countries today than in 1990. We also see that the 2012 density of RE share is 
shifted to the right of the 1990 density, indicating an increase in overall contribution of RE in 
electricity output. Note that each of the densities of RE share uses a particular smoothing 
parameter to make the figures easier to read. 
 
Figure 1. Upper panel – Logarithm of RE share and GDP per person; Lower panel – kernel 
density of RE share and GDP per person 
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Further details about these variables emerge from Table 1, which presents mean and 
standard deviation for the dependent and independent variables. For the sake of greater 
comparability, these descriptive statistics have been obtained using the original data without 
transformation.  
A few remarks are in order. Over the full sample, the average share of RE in most 
countries is low (5% or less), with the exception of Denmark, Finland, and Portugal. However, 
since 2000, the diffusion of RE has increased noticeably in countries such as Finland, Germany, 
and Spain, with a RE share of 10% or more. France remains an outlier, with a negligible 
contribution of RE to total energy (less than 2%). This is because nuclear energy accounts for 
over three-fourths of electricity production in France. Denmark, which has nearly zero 
hydroelectric resources, is really a forerunner in clean energy generation among EU countries. 
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RE sources in Denmark rely solely on wind energy and biomass, and have maintained an average 
share of 25% in the post-2000 period. Other countries in which the adoption of RE significantly 
increased in the new millennium are Austria, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden; with an 
average RE share of 7% or higher. Income per capita ranges from $16,940 (Portugal) to $43,757 
(Denmark), with the majority of the countries showing a per capita income above the $30,000 
threshold. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 GDP per person 
($2005 constant prices) 
 Share of RE in electricity 
production (%) 
      
Austria $34,478 4131.85  0.05 0.03 
Belgium $33,313 3349.07  0.02 0.03 
Denmark $43,757 4133.07  0.17 0.13 
Finland $32,975 5382.05  0.12 0.02 
France $31,689 2561.53  0.01 0.01 
Germany $32,615 2885.88  0.05 0.06 
Greece $18,713 2864.42  0.02 0.02 
Ireland $36,709 11522.27  0.04 0.05 
Italy $28,710 1816.59  0.04 0.04 
Netherlands $36,385 4431.14  0.05 0.04 
Portugal $16,940 1764.31  0.09 0.08 
Spain $23,281 2931.49  0.06 0.07 
Sweden $36,684 5371.15  0.05 0.04 
United Kingdom $33,631 5047.23  0.03 0.03 
United States $39,940 4581.35  0.03 0.01 
 
To make an individual country’s RE position conditional on its income level, Figure 2 
depicts a matrix that maps countries according to two dimensions. The first dimension is the 
country’s position regarding renewable development relative to the rest of the group. Hence, a 
country has a lower (higher) RE share if its average level is lower (higher) than the median level 
of all 15 countries over the observation period. Similarly, the second dimension, which reflects a 
country’s economic strength, identifies a country as having lower (higher) GDP per capita if its 
average income level is lower (higher) than the median income level of all countries over the 
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sample period. This perspective serves as a proxy for the relative ability to deploy the necessary 
measures to foster renewable energy development. The information in Figure 2 speaks for itself. 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain are clearly ahead in fostering the growth of non-hydro RE sources. In 
contrast, Belgium and the UK trail other nations in their effort to hit the energy targets set for 
202011. Overall, these results demonstrate substantial heterogeneity by income groups for their 
pursuit of fostering renewable energy sources. They also support that the CCE is the choice of 
estimator for this data, given its satisfactory small sample properties under a substantial degree 
of heterogeneity and dynamics for panels with relatively small values of N and T (see Pesaran 
(2006) for further details).  
Figure 2. The renewable energy-income matrix 
 Lower GDP per capita Higher GDP per capita 
Lower RE share France, Greece Belgium, UK, US 
Higher RE share Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Sweden 
 
Finally, Figure 3 shows the scatterplot of the two economic relationships considered in 
the analysis. The solid line represents a quadratic regression fit between the dependent (log RE 
share) and independent variables (log income and income squared) for the countries in our 
sample. Although this example is simplistic, we see evidence of a U-shape relation between RE 
share in electricity output and income per person, confirming our conjecture about the renewable 
version of the EKC theory. 
  
                                                          
11
 According to the Renewable Energy Directive, the EU countries are required to fulfil at least 20% of their total 
energy needs through renewable energy sources by 2020. Source: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-
energy  
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Figure 3. Scatterplot of log GDP per person and log RE share 
 
 
5. Results 
During the pretesting of the data, we investigated the time series and cross-section properties of 
all variables using the panel unit root test of Pesaran (2007) and the cross-section dependence 
test by Pesaran (2004). The results suggest that the variables have unit roots, implying that 
shocks have permanent effects. In addition, there is strong cross-section dependence in our panel, 
for both variables in levels and first differences. Since the variables are integrated of order one, a 
convention in the existing literature for testing the validity of the EKC hypothesis is by testing 
for the existence of the cointegrating relationship between the dependent (RE share) and 
independent variables (income and income squared). The results suggest that the null hypothesis 
-
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of no cointegration is rejected at the conventional level of significance, indicating a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between RE and income and income squared. These results are available 
in a Supplement.12 
 The estimation results for Equation (4) is as follows (standard errors in parenthesis)13: 
  ln 𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 745.73 + 0.018𝑡 – 237.67 ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡∗∗ + 11.56 ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡2∗∗     (7)  
  (646.90)  (0.050)  (121.27)  (5.84)  
 
As can be seen, the estimated coefficients for income and income squared are, 
respectively, negative and positive and statistically significant at the 5% level (indicated with 
asterisk **), which is consistent with our main hypothesis that the relationship between RE and 
income follows a U-shaped curve. According to this result, up to a certain income threshold, the 
contribution of RE to a country’s total electricity generation is negative (or nil). However, once 
the threshold income level is crossed, coupled with increased environmental awareness, the 
diffusion of RE sources increases. To verify that this result is not erroneously driven by an 
extreme point, we conduct a formal test for a U-shaped relationship using the likelihood ratio test 
proposed by Lind and Mehlum (2010). The result confirms that the Kuznets curve for the RE-
income relationship is indeed U-shaped, as we can reject the composite null hypothesis of 
monotone or inverse U-shape against the alternative hypothesis of a U-shape relationship (t-
value of 1.73, with a p-value of 0.041). More to the point, the t-value of the slope coefficient at 
the lower bound of the curve is -1.73 (p-value 0.941) versus a t-value at the upper bund equals to 
2.22 (p-value 0.013). Hence, there is a significant U-shape relationship over the range of the 
                                                          
12
 These results are in line with the recent findings by Aflaki et al. (2014) and Basher et al. (2015). 
13
 The estimated coefficients on the cross-sectional average are not presented because they do not have any 
meaningful interpretations. They are used in the regression to account for the impact of unobservable common 
factors.  
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data. Recently, similar evidence of a U-shaped relationship between renewable energy and 
income has been documented by Aflaki et al. (2014). 
The next step in our analysis is to compute the country-specific turning points. As 
mentioned earlier, the CCE estimator permits individual-specific regressors, which imply that it 
is possible to obtain estimates of income and income squared for each country in the panel that 
are used in the computation of the turning points – see Equation (2). The results are reported in 
Table 2. The estimates for Austria is clearly out of range, and therefore it is dropped from 
subsequent analysis.14 For all other countries, the turning point estimates range from $15,793 
(Portugal) to $56,073 (United States).  
Table 2. Turning points 
  
Austria $623,130 
Belgium $33,111 
Denmark $41,370 
Finland $28,191 
France $31,969 
Germany $31,716 
Greece $19,852 
Ireland $32,451 
Italy $32,279 
Netherlands $30,327 
Portugal $15,793 
Spain $23,833 
Sweden $38,878 
United Kingdom $41,981 
United States $56,073 
 
                                                          
14
 It is not unusual to find high turning points in the emission-income relationship. For example, in Holtz-Eakin and 
Selden (1995), the turning point occurs at a per capita income of US$ 8 million. To speculate on possible 
explanation for the higher turning point for Austria, there may be a need to use of a cubic function (rather than a 
quadratic form) on the possibility of a second turning point. Therefore, the assumed U-shaped relationship may be a 
statistical artifact in the sense that the ‘true’ relationship might be even more flexible that the one considered in the 
analysis (i.e. quadratic functional form that uses natural logarithm).    
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The final step in the analysis is to show the values of the wealth-adjusted index of 
environmental proactiveness for the countries in our sample using Equation (3). The results are 
displayed in Figure 4, in which the size of each bar represents a country’s pseudo-WTP for RE 
technologies relative to its wealth. Remember that the pseudo-WTP for RE is the difference 
between a country’s average income per capita and its turning point income per capita. That is, 
the difference between a country’s average income per capita and the threshold wealth level at 
which a country starts redirecting investments from polluting technologies to more 
environmentally friendly options (based on the assumption that EKC hypothesis is applicable). 
Therefore, countries like Netherlands or Finland that display positive pseudo-WTP’s can be 
considered environmentally proactive, because most segments of their population are willing to 
buy environmental products and services before other needs are satisfied. Conversely, countries 
with negative values of the pseudo-WTP index can be considered as environmentally passive, 
suggesting that investments in environmental technologies are a second-order priority for most of 
their population.  
The results indicate that for 8 of the 14 countries in the sample (Portugal, Germany, 
Belgium, France, Spain, Greece, Italy and Sweden) the difference between the average per-capita 
GDP and their turning point income per capita is relatively small (it does not exceed $1,500). 
Conversely for 6 countries (Netherlands, Finland, Ireland Denmark, United Kingdom and United 
States) the difference is much more significant. It exceeds $ 6,000 (positive) for the most 
proactive countries (e.g. Netherlands) and can be as large as $16,000 (negative) for the most 
passive countries such as the United States. It is also worth noticing that the pseudo WTP is 
larger (in absolute terms) for passive countries than for proactive countries.  
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The new wealth-adjusted RE ranking (calculated by ranking countries in descending 
order based on their pseudo-WTP values) is displayed in Table 3. Table 3 also compares the 
ranking issued from our wealth-adjusted method to the simpler ranking based on the percentage 
of electricity generated from renewable sources, one of the indices typically used to assess a 
country’s contribution to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Based on the simpler index 
(and excluding hydropower) between 1990 and 2012, Denmark and Finland were the obvious RE 
leaders, with average RE shares exceeding 10% of their total generating capacity, whereas 
Belgium, Greece and France were lagging at the bottom of the ranking with hardly noticeable 
contributions (between 1% and 2%). The United States were ranked at number 9. Our wealth-
adjusted index suggests a radically different picture, with the Netherlands and Ireland both 
climbing up seven places to finish first and third, and Denmark falling down to fourth place. 
France enjoys the biggest improvement, finishing eighth (+7 places), whereas the countries that 
lost most places are, surprisingly, Spain (-5 places) and Sweden (-4 places). The United States 
get also penalized (-3 places), ending up in 14th place. This result must be interpreted with care 
and not be taken as an indication of a future slow-down of RE development in the US. First, the 
result was driven by higher GDP levels in the US compared to EU countries in the period of our 
analysis. Second, it must be considered that most of the RE support policies implemented in the 
US (such as tender schemes, tax credits or net metering schemes) are market-based. In the early 
phases of the RE development cycles (i.e. when renewables were not yet cost competitive), such 
policies were less effective than the feed-in-tariffs schemes adopted by many EU countries. 
Conversely, this trend is likely to be reversed in the coming years. With the increased cost 
competitiveness of renewables, the market-based policies adopted in the US are providing a 
sharp acceleration to the development of renewables in the country. As an example, in 2017, the 
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US enjoyed the second largest new photovoltaic (PV) capacity PV growth in the World after 
China. 
 
Figure 4. Pseudo average willingness to pay for renewable energy sources 
 
 
 
Our results have important implications. First, they highlight an important feature of 
investments in environmentally friendly technologies: the amount of investment depends greatly 
on a country’s wealth. Second, our approach is unique in that it ranks countries not based on 
what they actually achieved but on what they could have achieved, given the resources available 
to them. Although subtle, the difference is important. If applied, the ranking would produce a 
significant change in the perceived greenness of certain countries and hence a change in their 
bargaining power in international negotiations. This is particularly timely given the ongoing 
debate on the right to pollute between developed and developing countries. It would also 
increase (or decrease) internal pressure on certain governments to implement or discontinue 
environmental policies such as feed-in tariffs or product take-back legislation. 
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Table 3. Environmental performance rankings by method 
 
  Ranking based on  
 Actual RE 
share (%) 
(2012) 
Average RE 
share 
(1990–2012) 
EPI 2012 Wealth-
adjusted 
environmental 
proactiveness 
Difference 
Denmark 47.62 1 21 4 –3 
Finland 16.03 2 19 2 = 
Portugal 30.21 3 41 5 –2 
Spain 22.49 4 32 9 –5 
Germany 18.88 5 11 6 –1 
Netherlands 11.95 7 16 1 +6 
Sweden 10.82 8 9 12 –4 
Ireland 16.16 9 36 3 +6 
Italy 16.25 10 8 11 –1 
United States 5.57 11 49 14 –3 
United 
Kingdom 
9.96 12 9 13 
–1 
Belgium 11.80 13 24 7 +6 
Greece 8.14 14 33 10 +4 
France 4.47 15 6 8 +7 
 
6. Conclusions 
Producing valid and reliable indicators to measure the sustainability performance of economic 
systems is no longer a mere academic exercise. Such indicators, especially when they are applied 
at the country level and are used to produce rankings, have relevant policy-making and business 
implications. A country’s perceived sustainability level has the potential to influence 
environmental legislation and ultimately to reshape competitive landscapes. In essence, “metrics 
and solid analytic underpinnings are critical not only for good environmental policymaking but 
also for sustainable development” (Esty et al., 2008).   
Although distinguished, most of the available sustainability indicators have been 
criticized for indirectly favoring richer nations. By offering a new framework for estimating the 
sustainability level of an economic system, this paper aims at providing robust and yet simple 
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metrics to facilitate a fairer discussion on the environmental performance of different countries 
or jurisdictions; one that takes into account their wealth and prosperity. The basic premise is that 
economic wealth significantly affects environmental performance. Therefore, instead of looking 
at how well each country performs in absolute terms, the proposed approach considers 
environmental performance relative to what countries should be doing based on their level of 
affluence. If economic prosperity would automatically lead to higher environmental 
performance, then the “greener” countries are those which start environmental investment at 
lower wealth levels, irrespective of their absolute level of performance.  
To achieve this goal we propose a simple three-step approach. After noting that the 
relationship between per capita GDP and environmental technology adoption is not linear, we 
econometrically estimate the environmental turning point—i.e. the wealth level at which 
environmental technologies start to be significantly adopted. Second, we compute the difference 
between a country’s average GDP per capita and its estimated environmental turning point. We 
then use the so-obtained index to rank countries based on their pseudo willingness-to-pay for 
cleaner technologies. To illustrate the approach, we apply it to the case of renewable energy 
adoption in 15 OECD countries from 1990 to 2012. We show that such an approach has the 
potential to significantly alter the nations’ environmental performance rank and that has 
important policy implications as it decouples the effect of economic development from that of 
environmental awareness in assessing a country’s sustainability performance.  
The main results can be summarized as follows. First, the relationship between RE and 
income follows a U-shaped curve. The estimated turning points range from $15,793 (Portugal) to 
$56,073 (United States). Second, the pseudo WTP for RE is larger (in absolute terms) for passive 
countries (e.g., the United States) than for proactive countries (e.g., Finland). Compared to a 
28 
 
simpler but commonly used ranking based on the percentage of electricity generated from 
renewable sources, our wealth-adjusted index produces a radically different ranking with 
countries like Netherlands and France exhibiting significant improvement in environmental 
proactiveness, while Spain and Sweden have slipped down the ranking. Our results have 
important implications. First, they highlight an important feature of investments in 
environmentally friendly technologies: the amount of investment depends greatly on a country’s 
wealth. Second, our approach is unique in that it ranks countries not based on what they actually 
achieved but on what they could have achieved, given the resources available to them. Although 
subtle, the difference is important. If applied, the ranking would produce a significant change in 
the perceived greenness of certain countries and hence a change in their bargaining power in 
international negotiations. It would also increase (or decrease) internal pressure on certain 
governments to implement or discontinue environmental policies such as feed-in tariffs or 
product take-back legislation.  
Although simple and robust, our approach is not exempt from certain limitations which 
indicate avenues for future research. First, to validate the method, we focus on investment in 
renewable energy technologies. Although renewable technology adoption is an indicator of 
environmental performance, it does not include other important environmental aspects such as 
waste management or water or soil pollution. While the neglecting this aspect from the current 
analysis does not limit the validity of the framework, it paves the way for future studies that take 
into account a multitude of other sustainability dimensions. Furthermore, we have tested our 
framework on a relatively small sample of countries. Extending this sample would be useful to 
further validate the proposed framework. 
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